On Benefit Sharing and the Compensatory Approach to Economic Development Takings

**1. Introduction**

In this article, I address the compensatory approach to the legitimacy of so-called economic development takings, which involve a commercial entity, often privately owned, benefiting from the state's power to compulsorily acquire property. The first question I discuss has to do with the status of the development project when calculating compensation to the property owner. Should the compensation reflect the commercial value of the development potential, or should this value be disregarded under a so-called `no-scheme' rule?[[1]](#footnote-1)

I provide some background to this question in Section 2, by briefly presenting the US debate on the legitimacy of economic development takings. Some scholars have argued that legitimacy of such takings can be increased by introducing compensation mechanisms that ensure benefit sharing.[[2]](#footnote-2) The broad aim of my article is to shed light on this suggestion, by presenting a comparative case study.

In Section 3, I present the no-scheme principle in more depth. I note that it appears to be the main obstacle to benefit sharing in practice. Variants of it are found in many jurisdictions, including the US. Here I choose to focus on the UK, where I believe recent developments in case law suggests a new take on the relationship between the no-scheme principle and the idea of benefit sharing.[[3]](#footnote-3) In particular, I argue that recent clarifications in UK law illustrate that despite appearances, the no-scheme principle can be interpreted in a way that makes benefit sharing possible in economic development cases.

Section 4 starts off the second part of my article, which is devoted to a case study of compensation procedures in Norway, particularly in the context of expropriation of waterfalls for hydropower development. This case study serves two main purposes. First, it is meant to shed light on some issues that arise when the tension between the no-scheme principle and the need for benefit sharing manifests in concrete cases. Second, the case study provides information on the feasibility of achieving fairness *in practice*, according to the normative stance I endorse.

My conclusion is somewhat pessimistic. In particular, I believe the situation in Norway illustrates inherent weaknesses of the compensatory approach to legitimacy, which are clearly felt as long as an overarching objective is to achieve benefit sharing with owners and their communities. Hence, I argue that more attention should be devoted to proposals that move beyond compensatory viewpoints, by attempting to formulate stricter public interest tests or institutional alternatives to expropriation.

**2. The Compensatory Approach to Economic Development Takings**

Arguably, the primary distinguishing feature of economic development takings is that they give (private) takers the opportunity to profit, often at the expense of owners and their communities. Commercial motives tend to dominate, with the public benefiting only indirectly through potential economic and social ripple effects. Hence, the issue of legitimacy can arise, since the public interest in the taking appears limited compared to the commercial interests of the taker. In the US, this issue arises with particular force because of the so-called `public use*’* requirement of the property clause in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution. When, if ever, may one regard a taking for profit as a taking for a public use? [[4]](#footnote-4)

Irrespectively of how one answers this question, a taking that results in a profit to the taker can raise legitimacy issues if it is seen as a disproportionate interference with the rights of property owners.[[5]](#footnote-5) One of the questions that can arise in this regard concerns *benefit sharing*, the extent to which owners are entitled to a share in the profit resulting from development.In a legal system that is based on private property rights, it is natural to expect owners to get a fair share of any profit that arises from commercial use of their land. Problematically, this is rarely achieved following a taking.[[6]](#footnote-6) Instead, a no-scheme rule typically kicks in, such that compensation is based on the pre-project value of the property that is taken.[[7]](#footnote-7)

The primary policy reason for no-scheme rules is that the public should not have to pay extra when it has a special want for some property. In particular, one of the main purposes of eminent domain is to solve the so-called *holdout problem*. This is the problem that arises if owners, in the absence of the eminent domain power, use their monopoly position to extort the public interest when important projects need to be carried out.

However, when the expropriation project unlocks a commercial potential, there appears to be a shortage of good policy reasons for disregarding this commercial value when compensating the owner. This is especially clear when, as in the US, compensation tends to be based on the market value of the land taken. Why disregard the taker's prospect of carrying out profitable development from the assessment of market value? In a fair and friendly transaction among rational agents, one would expect benefit sharing in a case like this.

Yet for economic development backed up by eminent domain, no-scheme rules tend to ensure that all the profit goes to the taker. In light of this, some authors have argued that failures of compensation is at the heart of the legitimacy issue. Some go as far as to suggest that worries over the public use restriction in the US Constitution should be seen as responses to concerns about the `uncompensated increment' of takings.[[8]](#footnote-8)

In addition to the question of benefit sharing, at least two additional compensation concerns have been identified. First, the problem of the `subjective premium' has been raised, pointing to the fact that property owners often value their own land higher than the market value, for personal reasons.[[9]](#footnote-9) For instance, if a home is condemned, the homeowner will typically suffer costs not covered by market value, such as the cost of moving, including both the immediate `objective' logistic costs as well as more subtle costs, such as the cost of having to familiarize oneself with a new local community. Second, the problem of `autonomy' has been discussed, based on concerns arising from the fact that eminent domain deprives the owner of her freedom to decide how to manage her property.[[10]](#footnote-10)

In this article, I only consider the challenge of achieving fair benefit sharing. It seems that achieving fairness in relation to other aspects is even harder. Hence, setting up a framework for benefit sharing is merely a first step towards a successful compensatory approach to economic development takings. But it is clearly a very significant step, and it has received quite some attention in recent scholarship.

In my opinion, the most interesting suggestion so far is due to Lehavi and Licht.[[11]](#footnote-11) They propose a new kind of institutional structure, called a *Special Purpose Development Corporation* (SPDC). The idea is that owners affected by eminent domain should be able to choose between standard pre-project market value and shares in an SPDC. This company will exist only to implement a specific step in the implementation of the development project, namely the transaction of the land-rights. [[12]](#footnote-12) The idea is that the SPDC will either choose to offer the property rights on an auction or else negotiate a deal with a designated developer.[[13]](#footnote-13) This is supposed to ensure that the owners receive the post-project value of the land, but in such a way that the holdout problem is avoided. After the sale is completed, the SPDC will divide the proceeds as dividends and be wound up.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Lehavi and Licht’s proposal stands out because it has a dynamic, institutional, component. Other scholars have tended to propose more static reforms, such as giving owners a fixed premium in cases of economic development, or developing mechanisms of self-assessment to ensure that compensation is based on the true value the owners attribute to their own land.

Merrill, for instance, proposes 150 % of market value for `suspect' takings, including those for which the public use requirement raises doubts.[[15]](#footnote-15) Krier and Serkin propose a system that provides compensation for a property's special suitability to its owner, or a system where compensation is based on the court's assessment of post-project value.[[16]](#footnote-16) Fennell proposes a system of self-evaluation of property for takings purposes with tax-breaks given to those who value their property close to market value (to avoid overestimation).[[17]](#footnote-17) Bell and Parchomovsky also propose self-evaluation, but rely on a different mechanism to prevent overestimation; tax liability is based on the self-reported value and no property can be sold by its owner for less than her reported value.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Compared to such proposals, I think Lehavi and Licht's suggestion is at once more realistic, more subtle, and more challenging to successfully implement in practice. It therefore seems appropriate to distinguish between the particularities of their institutional proposal and the conceptual premise that underlies it. In this way, one may address the latter without being side-tracked by objections based on practical challenges.

To this end, I identify the core of the SPDC proposal as the idea that takings for economic development can be seen as a form of compulsory incorporation, a pooling of resources that is useful in overcoming market failures.[[19]](#footnote-19) Just as regular corporations are formed to package assets for effective management, eminent domain is often used to assemble property rights in order to facilitate efficient organization of development. According to Lehavi and Licht:

The exercise of eminent domain powers thus resembles an incorporation by the government of all landowners with a view to brining all the critical assets under hierarchical governance. Establishing a corporation for this purpose and transferring land parcels to it thus would be merely a procedural manifestation of the substantive economic reality that already takes place in eminent domain cases.[[20]](#footnote-20)

As soon as we look at the rationale behind economic development takings in this way, we seem to lack good policy reasons for granting the entire profit to the taker. In many cases, the justification for eminent domain in economic development situations only extends to the necessary pooling of resources, without providing any justification for depriving owners of the commercial potential inherent in their land.[[21]](#footnote-21)

This perspective is clear, and in my view very attractive. On the practical side, however, it seems very difficult to come up with a reliable pricing mechanism that truly does justice to the idea. Merely setting up an SPDC seems insufficient, since it provides no guarantee that there will be an *actual*, well-functioning, market for its rights.

In particular, the fact that some development proposal has commercial potential does not by itself ensure that a market will form. Rather, it seems that many cases of eminent domain for economic development arise from land-use planning that set up *de facto* development monopolies, by specifying a form of development that is desired by specific developers. Indeed, the designated developers often take active part in the planning process, in some cases to the point of being the primary authors of the plans.[[22]](#footnote-22)

It seems largely unrealistic to think that other potential developers will be interested in competing for rights that are packaged to facilitate a specific development project undertaken by a specific party. Hence, to work in practice, it seems that the SPDC proposal needs to be accompanied by significant planning reforms. Alternatively, one has to fall back on some discretionary mechanism where appraisers are asked to determine what the price *should be*, or *would have been*, if there was a market, taking into account the commercial value of the project in question.

The challenge here is to formulate a much more comprehensive account of how to restructure planning so that it becomes more market-facilitating and owner-empowering, rather than a tool whereby powerful special interests assume *de facto* control over property owned by weaker parties. In this regard, the use of compulsion directed against property owners may well play a legitimate role, in some cases even as a source of *greater* benefit sharing with other property owners.

As an example of the subtleties of this regulatory challenge, I mention the so called *Mill Acts,* which were a source of controversy in many US states throughout the 19th century.[[23]](#footnote-23) The typical Mill Act provided a framework for managing jointly owned water resources, in many cases also by empowering the government to sanction private takings, where water rights would be transferred between private parties.[[24]](#footnote-24) This often resulted in legal conflicts were the contested issue was whether or not the public use test had been passed, so that eminent domain could legitimately be used.

This question arose universally in relation to many different kinds of Mill Acts. Hence, these acts have been grouped togheter by later commentators. In reality, however, the exact details of the property interferences at work could vary widely depending on the regulatory context.

In some cases, the private takings involved were pure economic development takings, allowing a cooperation with little or no prior connection to the land the right to condemn essential water resources wanted for economic development, e.g., for a hydropower project.[[25]](#footnote-25) In other cases, by contrast, private takings were sanctioned as part of a regulatory effort to provide benefits to affected property owners, as well as other water users*, as a community,* e.g., by preventing hold-outs from blocking the construction of grist mills to serve local farming needs.[[26]](#footnote-26) In yet other cases, the use of compulsion was meant to empower the owners of the most valuable water rights specifically, by granting them access to ancilliary rights, e.g., the right to flood their upstream neighbors upon payment of compensation.[[27]](#footnote-27)

In fact, I believe it is inappropriate to group all these kinds of property interferences together. Moreover, only the first kind of interference fall under the scope of what I would call a typical economic development taking. Interestingly, the position taken by state courts also varied on the issue of legitimacy with respect to private takings empowered by Mill Acts.[[28]](#footnote-28)

Some scholars argue that the divergence in state jurisprudence on this point can be understood as a doctrinal difference based on whether the courts relied on a `narrow’ or a `broad’ understanding of the public use requirement.[[29]](#footnote-29)

However, it seems to me that state courts also tended to adopt a contextual approach that allowed them to recognize important functional differences between different kinds of private takings. A further exploration of this must be left for future work. Here I would like to emphasise how some of the Mill Acts explicitly looked to ensure benefit sharing and a rational management of property rights, for *all* affected owners. Indeed, one interesting line of reasoning, consistently adopted by the Massachusetts state court in the late 19th century, justified private takings in hydropower cases by holding that they were not takings at all, but compulsory arrangements for cooperation among owners.[[30]](#footnote-30)

This line of reasoning ressonnates nicely with some of the overarching points made by Lehavi and Licht.[[31]](#footnote-31) However, the fact that later case law and scholarship has overlooked this earlier effort in the same direction also suggests the significant challenges involved in setting up a workable practical system along these lines.[[32]](#footnote-32)

I briefly return to this challenge towards the end of my article, but for now I focus on the conceptual premise, namely that owners should be paid based on their entitlement to a share of the incorporated value of their property rights for the purpose of development. This idea, in particular, appears to directly confront the no-scheme principle.

The next section is devoted to discussing this seeming tension in more depth. I will argue that, contrary to appearances, it is in fact possible to justify benefit sharing in economic development cases in a way that is consistent with (one interpretation of) the no-scheme principle. To do this, I look to the UK, where recent case law on the no-scheme rule seems to suggest an interpretation that remains quite open, in principle at least, to sharing of commercial values.

**3. The No-Scheme Principle**

The no-scheme principle is easy enough to comprehend when it is presented in general terms. The effect of the expropriation scheme should not influence the compensation award. But difficult questions arise as soon as this idea is to be applied in concrete cases. What the principle asks of appraisers, in particular, is quite demanding. They are forced to consider a counterfactual world where the expropriation scheme is not present, and they must calculate the value of property based on the workings of such an imaginary world. What exactly should this world be taken to look like?

It is tempting to consider this a ‘’question of fact for the arbitrator in each case’’, as expressed by the Privy Council in *Fraser*, a Canadian case from 1917.[[33]](#footnote-33) However, as the history of the no-scheme rule has shown, this point of view is not tenable.[[34]](#footnote-34) The problem is that the nature of the no-scheme world cannot be determined without making many assumptions, several of which will depend on how one understands the law. In the context of UK law, the challenges that arise in this regard were discussed in great detail by Lord Nicholls in the recent case of *Waters*.[[35]](#footnote-35) He described the task as ‘’daunting’’, noting also that some of the more recent statutory provisions in the UK ‘’defy ready comprehension’’.[[36]](#footnote-36)

In *Waters*, the Lords made a particular point out of resolving a tension that was identified between the principle relied on in the *Pointe Gourde* case from 1947 and the reasoning adopted in the so-called *Indian* case from 1939.[[37]](#footnote-37) In the *Indian* case, the scheme was given a very narrow interpretation, with Lord Romer interpreting the scope as follows:

The only difference that the scheme has made is that the acquiring

authority, who before the scheme were possible purchasers only, have

become purchasers who are under a pressing need to acquire the

land; and that is a circumstance that is never allowed to enhance the

value.[[38]](#footnote-38)

Importantly, this did not entail that the purchaser's demand for the property was to be disregarded, since, as Lord Romer puts it, “the fact is that the only possible purchaser of a potentiality is usually quite willing to pay for it”.[[39]](#footnote-39)

In *Pointe Gourde*, a different stance was adopted.[[40]](#footnote-40) The case concerned a quarry that was expropriated for the construction of a US naval base in Trinidad. Interestingly, the appraiser had found that if the quarry had not been forcibly acquired, it could have supplied the US naval base on a voluntary basis, thereby increasing its profits. However, the value of this potential fell to be disregarded, with Lord MacDermott describing the no-scheme rule as follows:

It is well settled that compensation for the compulsory acquisition of

land cannot include an increase in value, which is entirely due to the

scheme underlying the acquisition.[[41]](#footnote-41)

Seemingly, this is at odds with the position taken by Lord Romer in the *Indian* case. In particular, it seems clear that in the absence of a compulsory purchase order, the US military would likely have been “quite willing” to pay for the quarry's services.

In *Waters*, both Lord Nicholls and Lord Scott addressed this tension in great detail. They then offered a reconciliatory interpretation, which narrows the no-scheme rule compared to how it has usually been understood following *Pointe Gourde*.[[42]](#footnote-42) Moreover, the Lords noted the need for reform and legislation, with Lord Scott describing the current state of the law as ``highly unsatisfactory''.[[43]](#footnote-43)

To explain how a seemingly simple principle could become so troubling in practice, I think it is important to keep in mind that after the introduction of extensive planning legislation in the 20th century, development of property tends to be contingent on governmental licenses and plans. Moreover, the power to expropriate is often granted as a result of comprehensive regulation of the property-use in an area, following public plans that encompass more than the particular project that will benefit from compulsory purchase. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to ascertain what is meant by the `scheme' in compensation cases. Does it include the whole planning history leading to expropriation, does it only refer to the power to expropriate, or is it something in between?

Under a wide interpretation of the scheme, forcing the appraiser to entertain many counterfactual assumptions, the owner might come to feel that she is not compensated for her true loss, but rather an imaginary one. Indeed, the no-scheme world that the appraiser must consider can end up being far removed from the actual one, forcing him to go back many years, perhaps decades, to establish what would have been the status of the property in question if the sequence of planning steps eventually leading to expropriation had not taken place. This can leave the owner in an unpredictable and weak position. Taken to extremes, the no-scheme principle can then also come to run amiss with respect to human rights law and constitutional provisions protecting private property.

On the other hand, if the scheme is interpreted too narrowly, one runs the risk of endangering important public schemes by compelling the public to pay extortionate amounts. In many cases, it is undoubtedly true that the value of property is increased by public investments and plans for the area in which the property is found. Moreover, one may ask if it is right to pay compensation based on increases in value that result from investments and plans that would not have materialised unless the power to expropriate had been anticipated. This, it may be argued, would be a form of double payment that should be avoided.

It should be noted that the no-scheme principle embodies two distinct purposes that can branch out and give rise to quite distinct rules.[[44]](#footnote-44) First, the principle has an important *positive* dimension, which serves to enhance compensation payments. Property owners should not only be compensated for the direct loss of their property, but also for any depreciation of their property's value following the decision to implement a scheme which requires expropriation. Seemingly, this is easy to justify. It seems unreasonable if the deleterious effects of a threat of compulsion is permitted to result in reduced compensation payments.

However, under the extensive planning regimes common today, it is not clear where to draw the line. When is the regulation leading up to the scheme a reflection of public control over property use, and when should it be regarded as a measure specifically aimed at compelling private owners to give up their property? As we will see when we consider the role of the no-scheme principle in Norwegian law, this question can easily become highly controversial.

Moreover, it is a question that may be linked with the more general question of whether or not the state should be liable to pay compensation for regulation that adversely affects the potential for future development.[[45]](#footnote-45) In jurisdictions that do not usually recognize any right to such compensation, such as Norway and the UK, it is easily argued that the positive aspect of the no-scheme principle must be limited correspondingly. Why should a depreciation of value following regulation imply compensation when the property is eventually expropriated, but not otherwise?

In addition to its positive dimension, the no-scheme principle also has an important *negative* dimension, expressed in *Pointe Gourde* as the principle that an *increase* in value should be disregarded when it is “entirely due to the scheme”.[[46]](#footnote-46) The negative dimension has attracted more interest and controversy than the positive dimension, especially in the UK. The rules pertaining to this aspect of the principle were also at the centre of attention in *Waters*.

It is not surprising that the negative aspect of the no-scheme principle can result in complaints, as property owners stand to lose whenever it is applied. However, on a traditional understanding of the public purpose of expropriation, the negative aspect of the rule is also seemingly easy to justify. In *Waters*, Lord Nicholls describes the most important policy reasons as follows:

When granting a power to acquire land compulsorily for a particular purpose Parliament cannot have intended thereby to increase the value of the subject land. Parliament cannot have intended that the acquiring authority should pay as compensation a larger amount than the owner could reasonably have obtained for his land in the absence of the power. For the same reason there should also be disregarded the `special want' of an acquiring authority for a particular site which arises from the authority having been authorised to acquire it.[[47]](#footnote-47)

This appears like a reasonable justification. Notice, however, that Lord Nicholls avoids using the word `scheme'. Rather, he speaks of what the owner could reasonably have obtained in the *absence of the power* for the expropriating party to acquire the land compulsory. In this way, he seems to prescribe a rather narrow interpretation of the negative dimension of the no-scheme rule.[[48]](#footnote-48) It is the power to expropriate that should not give rise to an increased value, nothing at all is said at this stage about the scheme that benefits from it.

It would appear, therefore, that there is nothing in principle that prevents the property from being compensated on the basis of its value in a scheme that differs from the scheme underlying expropriation simply in that it has not been granted a power to expropriate. Indeed, this seems rather crucial for the remainder of Lord Nicholls' arguments, wherein he reconciles the principle adopted in the *Indian* case with that of *Pointe Gourde*.

In my opinion, this reasoning also permits us to formulate a new take on the no-scheme principle and benefit sharing in the context of economic development takings. In the absence of a power to expropriate, it seems clear that many commercial projects could still be implemented, if they relied on benefit sharing and cooperation with owners instead of compulsion. Hence, for the owners, the loss of a participation opportunity may often be regarded as a consequence of the expropriation in such cases. This loss should then be compensated. In fact, the right to such compensation should follow from the no-scheme rule itself, as formulated by Lord Nicholls in *Waters.*

That said, the issue of benefit sharing following compulosory purchase for commercial development does not appear to be resolved in UK case law. In fact, the issue has not, to my knowledge, been addressed explicitly by any of the higher courts. However, the UK Supreme Court touched on it in the recent case of *Bocardo*.[[49]](#footnote-49) This case was decided under dissent, suggesting also that the clarifications offered in *Waters* have not been as conclusive as hoped.

In *Bocardo,* conflict arose in relation to a reservoir of petroleum that could not be extracted without carrying out works beneath the surface owner’s land (the surface owner was not the owner of the petroleum). The first question that arose was whether or not the extraction that had already been carried out, without the surface owner’s permission, amounted to an infringement of property rights. This was answered in the affirmative. The second question that arose was how to compensate the owner. The Supreme Court, following some deliberation, found that the general rules applied, meaning that the case should be decided on the basis of an application of the no-scheme principle.

Opinions differed as to the correct interpretation of this principle, and with regards to how the facts should be held against the law. The crucial point of disagreement arose with respect to whether or not the special suitability, or *key value*, of the appellant's land, *pre-existed* the petroleum scheme.

In *Waters*, the House of Lords had cited and expressed support for the following passage, taken from Mann LJ's judgement in *Batchelor:*

If a premium value is ``entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition'' then it must be disregarded. If it was pre-existent to the acquisition it must in my judgement be regarded. To ignore the pre-existent value would be to expropriate it without compensation and would be to contravene the fundamental principle of equivalence.[[50]](#footnote-50)

Relying on this distinction between the potentialities that are `pre-existing' and those that are due to the scheme, the minority in *Bocardo*, led by Lord Clarke, made the following observation:

Anyone who had obtained a licence to search, bore for and get the petroleum under Bocardo’s land would have had precisely the same need to obtain a wayleave to obtain access to it if it was not to commit a trespass. So it was not the respondents' scheme that gave the relevant strata beneath Bocardo’s land its peculiar and unusual value. It was the geographical position that its land occupies above the apex of the reservoir, coupled with the fact that it was only by drilling through Bocardo’s land that any licence holder could obtain access to that part of the reservoir that gives it its key value.[[51]](#footnote-51)

This view was rejected by the majority, led by Lord Brown, who interpreted the no-scheme rule quite differently:

To my mind it is impossible to characterise the key value in the ancillary

right being granted here as `pre-existent' to the scheme. There is, of course,

always the chance that a statutory body with compulsory purchase powers may

need to acquire land or rights over land to accomplish a statutory purpose for

which these powers have been accorded to them. But that does not mean that upon

the materialisation of such a scheme, the `key' value of the land or rights which

now are required is to be regarded as `pre-existent’.[[52]](#footnote-52)

The case was resolved in keeping with this view, but the dissent shows that difficult questions can easily arise when the no-scheme principle is applied to an expropriation scheme that realises a commercial potential inherent in the land that is taken. Is it possible for government to grant the value of this potential to the taker, by granting the necessary licenses, without anyone, neither the government nor the license holder, having to recognize the potential as having been taken from the owner?

This issue does not primarily depend on the scope of the scheme as such. In *Bocardo*, it was obvious that the scheme was the entire project aimed at extracting petroleum from the reserve, including the necessary works beneath the appellant's estate. But even so, it was still unclear whether the special value of the appellant's land could be said to have been *caused* by the scheme. The deeper question that arises in these kinds of situations seems to be almost ontological. When should we attribute a given value to an act of government, and when should we attribute it to nature, by regarding it as a fruit of the land? Or in more practical legal terms: when is a property value that is unlocked by a development scheme part of the original owner's bundle of rights?

To answer this question, it is tempting to look for a causal link between scheme and value, to answer whether or not the value was pre-existent. But as *Bocardo* illustrates, it is not obvious what counts as good evidence for such a link. It seems that one's perspective on this will tend to depend also on one's point of view on the much more general question of what values one recognize as inherent in property rights.

Lord Clarke remarked that the state, following nationalisation in 1934, could have given the right to extract the petroleum to someone else.[[53]](#footnote-53) He was certainly correct. Hence, I also agree with him that ``the key value was not created by the 1934 Act or the grant of the petroleum licence to Star''.[[54]](#footnote-54) But whose value was it, and was it a commercially realisable value? Here Lord Clarke appears to assume that the value must have belonged to the surface owner and that this owner would also have been able to make a profit from it in the absence of the expropriation scheme. This, I believe, is a leap that requires further justification. Just because some property appears to have pre-existent value does not mean that the owner of the property is entitled to that value, or that the value can ever be translated into a financial profit for him.

On the one hand, it is easy to agree with Lord Clarke that compulsory acquisition of a wayleave is no precondition for an extraction scheme. Such projects can also be carried out by developers who are willing to pay surface owners for the special suitability of their land. On the other hand, it does not seem obvious that the owner is meant to be able to demand such payment under the regulatory system that has been put in place by the government. Hence, even in the absence of a causal link between scheme and value, one might be entitled to conclude that the special value falls to be disregarded because it has already effectively been removed from the owner's bundle (or was never part of it in the first place).

In the case of *Bocardo*, I think this perspective would have been particularly helpful to Lord Brown, who argued that the value of the strata was not pre-existent. As it stands, his argument seems rather strained. After all, it was the physical conditions that gave the land its value, not the abstract fact that a development license had been granted. However, by looking at his argument in more depth, it is tempting to rephrase his conclusion by saying that he regarded the special suitability of the strata as having no commercial value under the prevailing regulatory regime. Or, in other words, that he did not regard it as a part of the surface owner’s bundle.

In the end, I am agnostic about the correct way to judge *Bocardo*. Basically, I think the main question in that case was whether parliament had intended to give petroleum developers a right to extract substrata resources without sharing the profits with surface owners whose property has key value in relation to the extraction process. As no clear answer was available, conflict resulted. Moreover, the question itself became obfuscated. It seems to me, in particular, that the focus on causality and the notion of `pre-existence' was not very helpful. Rather, I think attention should have been explicitly directed at the issue of benefit sharing.

In general, the first question to ask when attempting to answer whether the value of some development potential should be compensated is whether this potential is supposed to be realisable for the property owner, given the regulatory framework. Is it part of her bundle? If this is unclear or the evidence suggests that owner realisation is not intended, the question becomes whether or not a claim can still be made on the basis of constitutional or human rights law. This question should then be openly addressed as a question of whether or not owners can demand benefit sharing.

If courts engage with the question of benefit sharing surreptitiously, without being explicit about it, the lack of democratic accountability can become a worry. Indeed, I think it is important to emphasize the political sensitivity of the range of complex rules found in compensation law. Moreover, the underlying political question should not be obfuscated to the extent that it can only be engaged with in a meaningful way by legal professionals.

If this happens, those who stand to gain the most will be those who are in a good position to lobby and argue on technical points to gradually shape the law of benefit sharing according to their own interests. I believe this point comes across well through the case study that I present in subsequent sections. Hence, I also think a conceptual shift might be appropriate here, to bring the politics of benefit sharing into the open, as a particularly crucial aspect of the compensation issue.

In any event, I think this question becomes much more pressing in cases when the main development potential as such is subject to expropriation, for instance when natural resources are expropriated. If it is hard to deny benefit sharing in cases like *Bocardo*, I think it should be even harder, if not impossible, in cases when the development potential is clearly inherent in the property that is taken, in a purely physical sense.

In these cases, it seems hard to imagine a public interest in bestowing the entire commercial benefit on the expropriating party, particularly when this party is a powerful commercial actor while the resource owners are members of the local community. It is telling that bestowing commercial values on the wealthy and powerful is rarely, if ever, the explicitly stated aim of such takings. It is only a (sometimes unacknowledged) side-effect. Hence, I believe constitutional and human rights limitations on the takings power can become particularly relevant here.

If nothing else, such safeguards can serve to bring the true nature of takings for profit into the open, so that they may be seen and assessed for what they are. Even if the courts feel the need to show deference to the legislator, the mere fact that the issue is raised and dealt with cautiously might be enough to set reforms in motion, as evidenced very clearly in the US in recent years.[[55]](#footnote-55)

At the same time, I note that benefit sharing in economic development cases might not be hindered by the no-scheme principle, as that principle is now understood in the UK. In light of *Waters* and *Bocardo*, it seems possible to get around no-scheme rules by arguing that commercial development potentials pre-exist particular development schemes. If so, such values should be allowed to influence compensation payments. If this stance is accepted, the compensatory approach to the legitimacy of economic development takings is off to a good start, as benefit sharing is shown to be possible even within a no-scheme framework.

The question remains how far this is likely to get us in practice. I address this in subsequent sections, by looking to Norwegian law. Here the main issues have crystallized further, particularly in relation to expropriation of waterfalls for hydropower development.

**4. Norwegian Compensation Law**

The owner's right to compensation following expropriation is enshrined in simple terms in Section 105 of the Norwegian Constitution.[[56]](#footnote-56) The rule is that *full compensation* is to be paid in all cases when the public interest necessitates compulsory acquisition of property. Until 1973, this was the sole legislative basis for compensation rules in Norway. During this time, the methods used to calculate full compensation in different scenarios developed entirely through case law. When legislation was eventually introduced, it was done to make the system more predictable and in order to ensure that compensation payments were reduced.[[57]](#footnote-57)

In Section 4.1, I present the judicial system for calculating compensation. I note, in particular, that the system is based on a process that relies heavily on the discretion of lay people. Then, in Section 4.2, I present the legislation currently in place, which is based on the notion that compensation should be calculated based on the `foreseeable' use of the property. This sets the stage for Section 5, where I discuss expropriation of waterfalls, for which compensation practices deviate from what is otherwise the norm, particularly in relation to the no-scheme principle.

**4.1 Appraisal Courts and ``Full Compensation''**

According to a long legal tradition in Norway, the discretionary aspects of property valuation is regulated by a special procedure, with a significant reliance on so called *unwilling appraisers*. These are members of the public who have no special connection to the case at hand or the parties involved in it. They may be chosen specifically for their suitability in judging the value of the contested property, either because they are resident in the local area or because they have special expertise.[[58]](#footnote-58)

The appraisal procedure has a long history and the rules regulating it today are found in the Appraisal Act 1917.[[59]](#footnote-59) Appraisal cases are organised similarly to civil disputes and are administered by the regular district courts.[[60]](#footnote-60) In appraisal disputes, the district court sits as an appraisal court, usually a panel consisting of one professional judge and four lay appraisers.

The panel decides jointly both the legal and the technical questions, usually on the basis of technical reports commissioned by the parties. These reports are presented during the main hearing and may be challenged by the parties, in more or less the same way as the district court hears evidence in a regular civil dispute.[[61]](#footnote-61)

There is a possibility of appeal to the appraisal court of appeal, which is the regional court of appeal sitting as an appraisal court in accordance with the rules of the Appraisal Act 1917. The right to an appeal hearing is not absolute, it depends on the importance of the case, according to rules that correspond to those for regular civil disputes.[[62]](#footnote-62) The procedure closely corresponds to the procedure followed in appraisal disputes at the district level.[[63]](#footnote-63) However, the decision made by the appraisal court of appeal is final as far the appraisal assessment is concerned. An appeal to the Supreme Court must target procedural rules or the court of appeal’s application of the law.

As a consequence of this, the appraisal courts have been very important in interpreting and developing the law relating to compensation in Norway. Their importance was particularly great when the meaning of `full compensation' was not further clarified in statute. At this time, the practical viewpoint enforced by the procedural form also meant that questions of law often remained in the background in appraisal cases.

A typical example of the traditional form of legal reasoning in compensation cases, from the time before legislation was introduced, can be found in the writings of the prominent legal scholar Frede Castberg. He specifically addressed the no-scheme principle and his reasoning in this regard was based directly on a reading of the Constitution. Moreover, he relied on the principle of *equality*, which was at that time considered particularly crucial in constitutional law. The following quote serves to sum up Castberg's position:

The owner is entitled to full compensation. The expropriation should not leave him worse off economically than other owners. Hence if the public has knowledge that an industrial undertaking is being planned, that a railway will be built etc, and this affects the value of property generally in a district, then the increased value of the property that will be expropriated must be taken into account. If not, the owners of such property will be worse off than other owners from the same district. On the other hand, if the expectation of the scheme underlying expropriation leads to a general depreciation of value, then it is this new value - not the original value - that is relevant for calculating compensation. The crucial question is what the actual value is, when expropriation takes place.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Castberg bases his analysis on the exact wording of the Constitution, but it is not correct to think that his reasoning is particularly `owner-friendly'. Indeed, Castberg explicitly states that in many cases, depreciation of value due to an expropriation scheme should not be disregarded. However, the intention is not to reject the no-scheme principle altogether. In particular, Castberg denies that owners of expropriated property should be able to claim compensation based on the special want of the acquiring party:

The situation is different if the property has increased value due to the expectation that it will be expropriated. The owner cannot demand that this increase is compensated since that would be the same as giving him a special advantage compared to those from whom no property is expropriated.[[65]](#footnote-65)

Hence, Castberg accepts a narrow version of the no-scheme principle, similar to that presented by Lord Romer in the *Indian* case. Castberg's view appears to have been shared by many academics of his day, and it was also largely reflected in case law from the Supreme Court. At the same time, the very nature of the system for deciding appraisal disputes gave the local appraisers great freedom in adapting the principles in a way that suited the circumstances of concrete cases. To some extent, this would also involve making an assessment of what was regarded as a fair and just outcome.

Importantly, fairness was seen as a concrete issue that had to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, not on the basis of general rules. The Supreme Court largely sanctioned this approach, by respecting the discretion of the appraisal courts. The way in which the no-scheme principle was applied serves as a nice illustration of this. On the one hand, the theoretical views of Castberg were widely accepted, but at the same time they were regarded as no more than guidelines that had to be adapted to the circumstances.

In fact, it was not unheard of for the lay appraisers to disagree with the judge about how this should be done. This happened, for instance, in the case of *Tuddal*, where land was expropriated for the construction of a power grid.[[66]](#footnote-66) The expropriating party also acquired the right to use a private road. According to the juridical judge in the appraisal court of appeal, compensation for this should be awarded solely on the basis of what the owners stood to lose. In his view, this meant compensation based on the increased cost of maintaining the road due to increased use.

However, the lay appraisers found this result unreasonable and awarded compensation also for the special value the use of the road would have for the acquiring party. The Supreme Court found fault with the reasons given by the lay appraisers, but agreed that such compensation was possible in principle. In reaching this conclusion, they reasoned that the owners were in effect compensated for the loss of a good bargaining position, an approach held to be appropriate under the `full compensation' principle.[[67]](#footnote-67)

The bargaining rule used to justify the decision in *Tuddal* is no longer considered good law. But the decision illustrates a broader point, namely that the Supreme Court was prepared to defer greatly to the judgement of the appraisal court. It was for this court to decide whether or not the lost opportunity to profit from negotiating with the expropriating party should be compensated.

This aspect of the decision is particularly noteworthy in light of the dissenting opinion of the juridical judge and the fact that it appeared to contradict the dominant legal theorizing of the day. Hence, the *Tuddal* decision tells us that the Supreme Court went far in defending the discretion of the lay people, as a *systemic* feature. The Court tested with great caution whether it was truly outside the permissible legal boundary, but concluded that it should be regarded as an exercise of the lay judgement that the system presupposed.

This impression of the case is accentuated when considering other cases dealing with similar issues. Across the board, I note a strong tendency to defend the role of the lay people in the appraisal process. A particularly clear expression of this can be found in *Marmor*, also from 1956, where the Supreme Court overturned a decision made by the appraisal court of appeal on the grounds that the court had been *too* reliant on general principles of law.[[68]](#footnote-68)

The case involved expropriation of a private railway track, for the construction of a public railway. It was clear that the track which was being expropriated did not have market value as such, as the expropriating party was the only interested buyer. Moreover, the expropriating party argued, on the basis of a no-scheme principle, that the value of these tracks to the public railway should not be taken into account when calculating compensation. The appraisal court of appeal agreed, pointing to the standard teaching of the day.

The Supreme Court, on the other hand, struck down the decision because it felt that a standardized approach to the case was inappropriate given the circumstances.[[69]](#footnote-69) To justify this conclusion, the presiding judge paid particular attention to the wider *context* of expropriation.

Importantly, he noted how expropriation had come to replace voluntary agreement as the standard means of acquisition for the type of development in question. Therefore, the practice of using expropriation effectively prevented a market from developing, a market that might otherwise have appeared naturally. He said:

I also point to the fact that the case concerns an area of activity where the expropriating party has a *de facto* monopoly which makes it impossible for anyone else to make use of the property for the same purpose. This in itself makes it questionable to simply assume that the lack of financial value for other purchasers provides the appropriate basis for calculating compensation. When considering this question, it is also appropriate to take into account that we have lately seen a great increase in the use of expropriation to undertake projects such as this. Compulsion is becoming the primary mode for acquisition of property -- replacing voluntary sale following friendly negotiations.[[70]](#footnote-70)

In my opinion, the importance of this decision is not that it seems to endorse a narrow interpretation of the no-scheme principle. In fact, I think it is erroneous to read the judgement as expressing support for any particular interpretation. Rather, I take the judgement to be an expression of scepticism towards uncritical obedience to *any* set of general rules for calculating compensation, particularly if these limit the room for lay discretion. Moreover, I note that the contextual factors that the Supreme Court highlights here are particularly relevant in the context of economic development takings, much more so than for the construction of public railways.

The days of *Tuddal* and *Marmor* have passed. In particular, there has been a marked shift of attention towards ensuring predictability in compensation disputes. Legislation has been introduced to achieve this, by limiting the freedom of the appraisal courts. In the next subsection I give a brief presentation of this, before I move on to consider waterfalls and hydropower.

**4.2 The Foreseeability Test**

Following World War II, the social democratic *Labour Party* gained a secure grip on political power in Norway. As a result, many reforms were carried out to reshape Norwegian society. One of the most important reforms introduced extensive planning legislation to ensure that land-use was placed more firmly under public control.[[71]](#footnote-71) This period also saw expropriation being used more extensively to facilitate public projects, such as hydropower development for the supply of electricity.[[72]](#footnote-72) As a result of this, many felt that a more uniform approach to compensation was needed. In addition, it became an explicitly stated political goal to bring compensation payments down.[[73]](#footnote-73)

In 1965, the so called *Husaas committee* was appointed by the King in Council and charged with the task of assessing the compensation rules currently in place.[[74]](#footnote-74) The committee was also ordered to make a concrete suggestion regarding the need for additional principles of compensation, and to consider if these should be given in the form of a special compensation act.

Initially there was some doubt as to the extent to which is was at all permissible to give rules regulating compensation, as the constitution itself addressed the matter. However, the committee noted that some rules had already been introduced for specific case types, for instance in relation to expropriation for hydropower development.[[75]](#footnote-75) In addition, legal scholars of the day were generally of the opinion that compensation rules could be given, on the understanding that the courts would simply deviate from them in so far as they seemed to go against the Constitution.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Following up on this, the Husaas committee formulated an overarching principle that has since become particularly crucial, namely that owners are only entitled to compensation based on a `foreseeable' use of their property. The committee argued that this was an interpretation of `full compensation' that was already entrenched in case law, but should also be explicitly encoded in statute.[[77]](#footnote-77)

Interestingly, the foreseeability test was taken to imply the no-scheme principle. In particular, it was assumed that the assessment of foreseeability would be made independently of the scheme underlying expropriation.[[78]](#footnote-78) Hence, it was no longer only the special want of the expropriating party that should not be taken into account, the entire scheme should be disregarded.[[79]](#footnote-79) Here the Husaas committee seems to have taken the principle further than what followed from earlier case law, at least according to scholars such as Castberg.

However, the view of the committee was eventually rejected by the government. Interestingly, it was considered too owner-friendly, as it was felt that it did not sufficiently limit the possibility for compensation based on potential future property uses. To make better progress in this regard, the Ministry of Justice proposed an act to parliament that deviated quite significantly from the proposals of the Husaas committee.

Instead of encoding existing principles, the Ministry pushed for the principle that compensation should normally be based on the value of the *current use* of the property.[[80]](#footnote-80) This was the main rule introduced in the Expropriation Compensation Act 1973. The main argument used in favour of the rule was that the public should not have to pay a financial premium to owners based on possible future uses that would be contingent on permission from the government.[[81]](#footnote-81)

However, the Ministry set up two exceptions to the current use rule, based on fairness and constitutional law. The first, which received by far the most attention, was based on a desire to ensure some degree of equality between owners.[[82]](#footnote-82) This exception stipulated that the appraisal courts should be free to deviate from the current use rule in so far as they felt that it was reasonable to do so in order to prevent affected owners from being overly disadvantaged compared to other owners, not affected by expropriation.[[83]](#footnote-83)

This exception would prove highly controversial, since it was only formulated as rule that `could' be used to increase the compensation. In *Kløfta*, the Supreme Court eventually deviated from this and made clear that additional compensation was *obligatory* in a range of cases when the intention had clearly been that the rule should be used sparingly.

The second exception received far less attention, but in my opinion it is the more interesting of the two. This exception was motivated by a desire to ensure equality between the taker and the owner, particularly in so far as the taker could not be regarded merely as an embodiment of public values. Importantly, the rule sought to address precisely the situation that arises when the taker benefits commercially from the expropriation. As explained by the Ministry:

The second modification we make has to do with the relationship between the property owner and the expropriating party. If the use of the property that the expropriation presupposes gives the property a value that is significantly higher than the value suggested by current use, this will entail a transfer of value from the property owner to the acquiring party. In some cases this might be unreasonable. As an example of when this can become an issue, we mention an agricultural property that is expropriated for the purposes of industrial production. In such a case it might be natural that the owner receives a certain share in the increased value that the new use of the property will lead to. [...] To establish a flexible system, the Ministry has concluded that it is practical that the King gives rules concerning the cases where an enhanced compensation payment, based on these principles, might be appropriate. This should not be decided by individual assessment, but governed by rules for special case types. Hence, the proposed Act states that the King can pass regulation concerning this matter.[[84]](#footnote-84)

This quote went right to the heart of the benefit sharing problem in economic development takings and it proposed a possible remedy. However, the Ministry took the view that this remedy should *not* be administered by the appraisal courts, but should be left in the hands of the executive. Hence, there was reason to worry that the suggestion would not work well in practice.

Indeed, this particular aspect of the 1973 Act was largely overlooked and forgotten and no rules such as those proposed by the Ministry were ever introduced. In general, procedural and contextual aspects of decision-making in appraisal disputes seem to have been overlooked by those pushing for the 1973 Act. Since the appraisal courts were regarded as compensating owners too generously, their freedom of discretion was seen as a weakness rather than a strength.

I think this is regrettable. If the new Act had been more temperate and respectful, by encouraging the appraisal courts to take a broader view on fairness, it might have been a success. Instead, it caused an outcry, with attention shifting away from practical matters towards doctrinal issues. The primary such issue, and the most serious one, concerned the question of whether the Act as such was in breach of the Constitution.

In effect, this was the issue that came before the Supreme Court in the case of *Kløfta* in 1976.[[85]](#footnote-85) As I mentioned, the 1973 Act was significantly reinterpreted in this case, to make it appear less offensive to the constitutional standard of full compensation. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court largely accepted the rationale behind the Act and agreed that appraisal practice needed to be adjusted accordingly. Moreover, in implementing the needed readjustment in practice, the Court arguably also contributed to further undermining the appraisal courts.

Not only were these courts now constrained by an Act that seemed to go against the Constitution, they were also ordered from above to openly deviate from its exact wording. However, they were told only to do so in a select group of cases meeting certain pre-defined criteria. In essence, the Supreme Court itself assumed greater control over how compensation law was to be applied, no longer merely in broad strokes, but increasingly also by developing special rules for specific case types.[[86]](#footnote-86)

Eventually, some further clarification was provided in the form of the Expropriation Compensation Act 1984, which is still in force today. This Act reverts back to the `foreseeability' test proposed by the Husaas committee. In general, compensation is to based either on the value of use or the market value of the property, whichever is highest.[[87]](#footnote-87) The Act regulates in some further detail how the assessment is to be carried out, also by explicitly introducing some disregard rules that encode various aspects of the no-scheme principle.[[88]](#footnote-88)

The guiding idea is that the value of the property is calculated based on a use of the property that appears natural and likely to arise given the surrounding conditions. In relation to the market value, there is an additional requirement, namely that the use must be one that an `average' buyer would be likely to make of the property. Hence, a general market value should be found, not a value arising from selling the property to a specially interested party.

However, the 1984 Act leaves open many crucial questions, so that case law from the Supreme Court has become increasingly important. The extent to which the foreseeability requirement entails that the property use in question has to be in accordance with current land-use plans is particularly thorny. In general, the Norwegian system stands out because plans are usually *not* disregarded, even in situations when they are closely related to, or directly authorise, the expropriation scheme.[[89]](#footnote-89) This approach is usually to the *disadvantage* of the owner, since other aspects of the no-scheme principle still applies in a way that tends to prevent benefit sharing through compensation.

In practice, when land-use plans are not disregarded, the compensation usually ends up being based on current use assessments, reverting back to the rule introduced by the 1973 Act.[[90]](#footnote-90) Hence, in Norwegian law there is a clear asymmetry between the negative and positive aspect of the no-scheme principle. In general, the positive aspect, leading to increased compensation, is applied narrowly, while the negative aspect, leading to reduced compensation, is applied broadly. It is not surprising, therefore, that disputes often arise in relation to the foreseeability test, or else in relation to one of the disregard rules that encode aspects of the no-scheme principle.

Following *Kløfta*, there has been a growing expectation that hard cases should be resolved by crisp rules. Appraisal courts are no longer considered free to assess cases directly against the Constitution. As a result, difficult cases now routinely end up in the Supreme Court who often censor the appraisal courts. More and more specific rules for special case types are produced. This is particularly marked in relation to the question of how to deal with land-use plans that give rise to expropriation.

For instance, one exception to the main rule targets certain kinds of roads and public buildings, so that an expropriation plan designating a property to one of these uses should sometimes be disregarded for compensation purposes.[[91]](#footnote-91) But where should the line be drawn? The Supreme Court now largely takes it upon itself to shape the law in this area, down to a questionable level of detail.

The two most recent decisions stipulate that a plan for a sports hall should be disregarded, while a plan for a public footpath should not. The distinction between the two seems rather arbitrary, particularly as this now sets a precedent which will tend to apply to footpaths and sports halls in general. In my opinion, the development of an increasing number of special rules such as these threaten to undermine the procedure used to decide appraisal disputes, which has a long history in Norwegian law.[[92]](#footnote-92)

In the following section, I will turn to waterfalls and hydropower. Interestingly, the compensation practices here often deviate significantly from those observed in relation to other kinds of development. In particular, a more traditional approach continues to dominate in these cases, since the rules enacted through legislation do not readily apply. However, while the traditional method of compensating waterfalls is based on benefit sharing, it has become highly standardized and artificial over time. Today, it is perceived as deeply unjust by owners who may be deprived of extremely valuable natural resources and paid only a fraction of their true value.[[93]](#footnote-93)

This points to the inherent difficulty of attempting to ensure reasonable benefit sharing through compensation. Looking at compensation rules as they are applied to waterfalls today further underscores this, as the courts now grapple with the disintegration of the traditional method, and the question of what should replace it.

**5. Compensation for Waterfalls**

A general expropriation authority covering riparian rights in streams and waterfalls in Norway did not exist until early in the 20th century. Prior to this, Norwegian water resources had been regulated by rules similar to those found in many 19th century US Mill Acts, c.f., my discussion in Section 2. Just like in many US states, the main objective had been to facilitate owner-led development and cooperation.[[94]](#footnote-94) No one, not even the state, could expropriate the right to harness the power in water as such; the possibility of expropriation was strictly limited to ancilliary rights.[[95]](#footnote-95)

However, at the beginning of the 20th century, the perspective on water resource management changed. Instead of being seen as a local, owner-led pursuit, the development of hydropower came to be seen as a task for the government. This led to the introduction of wider expropriation authorities, accompanied by a regulatory regime that made commercial development of hydropower difficult or impossible. Essentially, the hydropower sector came to be organized as a government monopoly.[[96]](#footnote-96) This, in turn, meant that the market for riparian rights to undertake hydropower projects all but disappeared.[[97]](#footnote-97)

In these circumstances, a strict application of the no-scheme rule could lead to no compensation being paid at all (except for damages). In practice, streams and waterfalls had little or no value except to the acquiring public authority. However, the appraisal courts did not follow this to its logical conclusion. Instead, they introduced a theoretical formula for calculating compensation, to avoid what was felt to be an unreasonable outcome.[[98]](#footnote-98)

In effect, the theoretical method consisted in setting up an artificial market for waterfalls, with prices fixed by the appraisal courts, on the basis of comparing with previous appraisal cases. It was even decided that additional benefit sharing was appropriate, as the legislature introduced a rule stipulating that the expropriating party should always pay a 25% premium in hydropower cases.[[99]](#footnote-99)

Hence, the traditional method for compensating waterfalls in Norway was based on ideas that are very similar to those that are now considered in the US debate on economic development takings, as discussed in Section 2. Moreover, these rules have been in place for almost 100 years in Norway, giving us a good basis for assessing how well they work in practice.

In the next subsection, I present the traditional method in more detail, before I present more recent developments, in particular the consequences of the recent liberalization of the energy sector.

**5.1 A Case Study of Compensatory Benefit Sharing: The Natural Horsepower Method**

Initially, the artificial market created to compensate waterfall owners was modelled on the actual market that had existed prior to the regulatory reforms of the early 1900s.[[100]](#footnote-100) The key notion used to determine the price of a waterfall on this market was that of a *natural horsepower*, a gross measure of electric effect.[[101]](#footnote-101) The lack of a national grid at this time meant that the value of a hydropower plant was largely determined by the stable effect that the plant could deliver, not the total amount of electricity that could be produced.

The notion of natural horsepower was originally introduced to simplify calculations, as a gross estimate of the stable effect that the project could yield. The value of the waterfall itself was then determined by fixing a price per natural horsepower. This price was set on the basis of prices paid for other waterfalls, possibly with some adjustments to account for the estimated costs and benefits associated with the hydropower project in question.

The natural horsepower method had no legislative basis, but arose as a result of the appraisal courts' efforts to calculate market prices. Then, after the market disappeared as a result of monopolization, the method stuck and was applied customarily by the courts.[[102]](#footnote-102)

The standard account of the natural horsepower method states that the number of natural horsepower in a waterfall is a measure of the `raw' power in the waterfall.[[103]](#footnote-103) This is not accurate, as the natural horsepower `of the waterfall' actually depends crucially on what kind of development project the expropriating party proposes.

Hence, it is more accurate to speak of the natural horsepower of the development scheme benefiting from expropriation. Moreover, the natural horsepower of a development project is a measure of gross stable effect, so it also depends crucially on the nature of the proposed watercourse regulation.[[104]](#footnote-104) Today, many hydropower plants, particularly smaller ones, involve little or no regulation. Instead, such run-of-river scheme operate by harnessing energy from whatever water is present in the river at any given time. For these projects, the natural horsepower can be zero or close to zero, depending on what formula is used when performing the necessary calculations.[[105]](#footnote-105)

This underscores that the natural horsepower of a development scheme often has little or no bearing on the amount of energy that will actually be harnessed from the hydropower plant. Moreover, the annual income of a hydroelectric plant has little or nothing to do with its natural horsepower.[[106]](#footnote-106) The income is solely a function of the price paid per kilowatthour and the total number of kilowatthours harnessed over the year (kWh/year). Today, energy producers get paid for the amount of energy they can deliver, *not* the effect they can maintain stably in their station over a long duration of time. Talking of natural horsepower therefore serves to give a skewed picture of the potential of a waterfall, especially for run-of-river projects (not involving regulation of the water-flow).

Within the ranks of the specialized water authorities, the inadequacies of the notion has long been common knowledge. The first statement I can find to this effect, made by the director of the water directorate, dates all the way back to 1956, from an internal newsletter.[[107]](#footnote-107) Here it is made clear that compensation practices generally fail to reflect actual values of waterfalls. Moreover, the director suggests that the appraisal procedure operates by exploiting owners' lack of knowledge regarding the true value of the natural resources that they own.

While the idea of compensating the owner of waterfalls by a price per natural horsepower is flawed at the theoretical level, great concerns arise also in relation to how the unit price has been determined *in practice*. The traditional approach in this regard has had a particularly dramatic effect on the level of compensation payments. Interestingly, it is often said that the price awarded per natural horsepower is set according to a `market price' for waterfalls. But for the most part, what this means is that the court looks to prices awarded in earlier compensation cases. Hence, the price level appears to be court-determined, not determined by the market. This, moreover, seems to have resulted in a system where compensation levels reflect the power balance between buyer and seller in the courtroom, not the actual value of waterfalls.[[108]](#footnote-108)

While the price level was determined by the courts, owners would sometimes enter into voluntary agreements. Typically, such agreements were also based on the natural horsepower method, operating at roughly the same price level.[[109]](#footnote-109) Hence, voluntary agreements could be used to back up the claim that the natural horsepower method was a market-based valuation principle. In this way, it became possible to legitimize an increasing imbalance of power between owners and purchasers. In the end, this imbalance became extreme.

One example is the case of *Hellandsfoss*, which concerned waterfalls that currently yield 151 GWh/year in a run-of-river hydropower plant.[[110]](#footnote-110) In 1999, the appraisal court of appeal held that this corresponded to 7099 natural horsepower and that the unit price should be set at kr 130.[[111]](#footnote-111) Hence, the value of the waterfall was estimated to be kr 922 870. This sum, with an additional premium of 25 %, formed the basis of compensation to the owners.[[112]](#footnote-112)

For comparison, in the case of *Sauda* from 2009, where an *actual* market-value was calculated, several waterfalls that could be used in run-of-river schemes were valued at about 1 kr/kWh annual production.[[113]](#footnote-113) If a comparable valuation method had been applied in *Hellandsfoss,* the owners would have received about 150 times more in compensation than they got under the natural horsepower regime.[[114]](#footnote-114)

The feedback effect on the `free’ market is particularly noteworthy. As an example, I mention a waterfall located in the rural community of Måren, in the municipality of Høyanger in south-west Norway. This waterfall, which had previously been used in a small powerplant to supply the local village, was apparently sold to the municipality in 2002 for the sum of kr 45 000, based on traditional calculations.[[115]](#footnote-115) The waterfall was then sold on and exploited in a hydropower plant belonging to the large energy company BKK, with annual energy output of 21 GWh.[[116]](#footnote-116) If the *Sauda* price had been paid here, the compensation would have gone from kr 45 000 to kr 21 000 000. That is, the price would have been almost 500 times higher.[[117]](#footnote-117)

This illustrates the crucial point, namely that when the traditional method was described as the `market value' of waterfalls by the courts, this became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The prices paid in voluntary transactions were influenced by the practices adopted by the courts, not the other way around.

In general, when the power to expropriate is made widely available for some particular purpose, prices for property suitable for this purpose can be kept artificially low, since developers can choose to make use of expropriation, to shape the property market so that it suits their interests. Instead of competing for a deal with owners, developers can compete to be the first to acquire an expropriation license from the state. In this way, even if the system prescribes `market value' compensation, an artificial price level can be established and maintained through the use of expropriation.[[118]](#footnote-118)

In my opinion, preventing such a mechanism from undermining the fairness of the compensation regime is an important challenge associated with regulatory systems that presuppose extensive use of expropriation for commercial development. Failure to address this appropriately can create financial incentives for developers to favour expropriation over friendly negotiations or cooperation with owners. In this way, a vicious circle can form, making it hard to break out of the `expropriation loop'.

**5.2 New Methods for Compensating Waterfalls**

In the early 1990s, the Norwegian energy sector was liberalized, so that hydropower development came to be organized as a for-profit pursuit. As a result, the traditional method for compensating owners came under increasing pressure. The owners themselves began to protest its use and they were joined in their opposition by some engineers and smaller hydropower companies specializing in small-scale development in cooperation with owners.[[119]](#footnote-119) Eventually, legal professionals followed suit and came to the realization that compensation based on *actual* market values could be awarded. [[120]](#footnote-120)

Indeed, a new market for waterfalls had begun to develop at this point, following increased interest in small-scale hydropower, also from new companies specializing in cooperation with local owners. For transactions of rights to waterfalls on this market, the traditional method of valuation is not used. In fact, waterfalls are rarely sold at all. Instead, they are leased to the development company for an annual fee. Typically, this fee is calculated by fixing a percentage of the energy produced during the year and compensating the owners of the waterfall by multiplying this with the market price for electricity obtained throughout the year, possibly after deducting production specific taxes, but with no deduction of other costs. In effect, owners get a fee corresponding to a set percentage of annual gross income in the hydro-power plant.[[121]](#footnote-121) Today, such a fee typically entitles the owners to 10-20 % of the gross income, depending on the profitability of the project.

Since leasehold agreements tie compensation to the fate of the hydropower project, several questions arise when attempting to estimate a present-day value of a waterfall on this market. The appraisers first have to determine what the most likely project looks like. Then they have to determine what the annual production will be. After this, they must assess the cost of constructing the plant, something that will in turn make it possible to estimate the level of rent likely to be paid to the waterfall owners. Then, since this rent is set as a percentage of the income from sale of electricity and energy certificates, the appraisers must stipulate future prices, usually for 40 years into the future (the usual duration of a leasehold). Finally, a present-day value can be calculated based on future cash-flows.

The appraisal courts began to use such a model around 2005. The first case of this kind to reach the Supreme Court was *Uleberg*.[[122]](#footnote-122) In the appraisal court of appeal, the lay appraisers overruled the juridical judge and awarded compensation based on the new method. The Supreme Court ordered a retrial, but commented that it supported the adoption of the new method whenever an *alternative* small-scale project was deemed to be a foreseeable use of the waterfall in the absence of the expropriation scheme. Since *Uleberg*, the new method has been used in several cases before the appraisal courts.[[123]](#footnote-123)

It is interesting to note that it was the lay appraisers that pushed for a new method initially, sometimes in opposition to the juridical judge. I believe this shows that the old system of lay judgement in appraisal disputes still plays a role in Norway. Moreover, I also think it demonstrates that the system has positive qualities that should be preserved in the future. However, that is not to say that the new method is without problems.

Unsurprisingly, it tends to lead to a rather protracted process of valuation, mostly dominated by experts. Moreover, given all the uncertain elements of the calculation, it is typical that the opposing parties produce expert witnesses that diverge significantly in their valuations. While this can be problematic, the fundamental *legal* challenge arises with respect to the no-scheme rule. In particular, what hydropower scheme should the compensation be based on? Several questions arise, some of which are listed below.

1. Is it foreseeable that the waterfall could be used in a hydropower project in the absence of a power to expropriate?
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, what would such a scheme have looked like?
3. Is it foreseeable that the scheme from 2 would obtain the necessary licenses?
4. Does the no-scheme rule imply that no project similar or identical to that benefiting from expropriation can be regarded as foreseeable for the purpose of compensation?
5. Is the fact that the scheme underlying expropriation obtained a development license evidence that alternative (inferior) schemes would not have been granted a license?
6. How should compensation be calculated if it is determined that no (alternative) hydropower scheme would have been foreseeable?

In some cases, for instance when the project benefiting from expropriation is not commercially viable but is carried out for public purposes with the help of special state funding, the answer to question 1 might be no. However, in most cases, the question will be answered in the affirmative, since the scheme benefiting from expropriation already serves as an indication that the waterfall can be commercially harnessed for energy. However, here the no-scheme rule comes into play and creates difficulty once we reach question 2. For what kind of scheme can be assumed foreseeable all the while we are obliged to disregard the scheme underlying expropriation?

In most cases so far, the owners have claimed that compensation should be based on the value of a small-scale hydropower scheme. Since such a scheme is likely to be clearly distinct from the expropriation scheme (which tends to be large-scale), one might think that the no-scheme rule will not come into play. This, however, is not necessarily the case, as the answer to question 3, asking about the likelihood of obtaining licenses, still depends on how one views the no-scheme rule. In particular, anyone who answers question 5 in the affirmative, will be inclined to say that the alternative project could not expect to obtain a development licence.

This is so, such a person might argue, precisely *because* licenses were granted to the expropriating party. This line of reasoning has been consistently advocated by the large energy companies, ever since the new method emerged.[[124]](#footnote-124) Is their argument at odds with the no-scheme rule? It would seem so, but remember the earlier discussion on the no-scheme rule in Norwegian law. I noted, in particular, that the rule tends to be applied much more narrowly along its positive dimension. Hence, it can be argued in Norway that even if the expropriation scheme is disregarded, the land-use regulation underlying the scheme, or at least the rationale behind this regulation, should be taken into account. If this point of view is adopted, then the conclusion can easily become that alternative development is unforeseeable, simply because it is less profitable than the optimal use of the resource, which happens to be that of the expropriation scheme.

This line of reasoning might seem perverse, but was given a stamp of approval in the recent Supreme Court case of *Otra II*.[[125]](#footnote-125) Here the Court concluded that the development plans of the expropriating party were so superior that alternative development was unforeseeable. Hence, the no-scheme principle was not applied along its positive dimension. In particular, the principle did not prevent the conclusion that the superiority of the expropriation scheme meant that alternatives would have been unforeseeable.

After concluding in this way, the Court needed to answer question 6 by coming up with some alternative way of compensating the owners. To do so, the Court was again faced with considering the implications of the expropriation scheme. One possibility would be to simply ignore the no-scheme principle completely. Indeed, as the superiority of the expropriation scheme was used to rule out alternatives, it might seem natural to use it also as the basis for valuation. This is what the appraisal court of appeal had done, and the Supreme Court sanctioned the approach. But at this point, the adherence to a `market value' approach worked to the great detriment of the owners. The presiding judge, in particular, reasoned as follows:

Based on the arguments presented to the Supreme Court, I find it safe to assume that there does not today exist any market for the sale and leasing of waterfalls for which alternative development is not foreseeable, but where the waterfalls can be used in more complex hydropower schemes. The appellants have not been able to produce documents or prices to document the existence of such a market.[[126]](#footnote-126)

The assumption is that in order to value the waterfall according to its potential for hydropower production, a market needs to be identified. It is not considered sufficient that the scheme for which expropriation takes place is a commercial project. But how could a market of the kind asked for here ever develop? After all, alternative buyers (the existence of whom had been documented in *Otra II*) were all excluded from consideration because their development schemes were held to be unforeseeable.

Taken to its logical conclusion, the line of reasoning in *Otra II* leads to an offensive result: the commercial value of the property taken should not be compensated *because* the optimal commercial use is the use that the expropriating party aims to make of it. Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court shunned away from explicitly endorsing this conclusion. Instead, it sanctioned compensation based on benefit sharing, using the natural horsepower method.

Leaving aside questions about the Court's application of the foreseeability test and the no-scheme principle, was it appropriate to prescribe the traditional method? In light of the evidence that has emerged regarding its shortcomings, this seems highly questionable. But is there a better alternative, when alterantive development is regarded as unforeseeable?

Towards a possible answer, let us follow Lord Nicholls and avoid talk of `schemes’, so that we may reason instead on the basis of what would have happened in the absence of a power to expropriate. In cases such as *Otra II*, it seems likely that a scheme corresponding closely to that underlying expropriation would still be implemented. This scheme, however, would then have to be carried out on the basis of *actual* cooperation and benefit sharing with owners.

If we think like this, focus shifts from theoretical benefit sharing imposed through the natural horsepower method, towards trying to the determine, under the foreseeability test, what would have been the actual benefit sharing in a joint enterprise. This subtle change of perspective could make a dramatic difference. In particular, it would allow us to anchor the compensation assessment in a concrete, albeit counterfactual, benefit sharing scenario.

In *Otra II*, this line of thought was not considered in any depth, but mentioned briefly and rejected.[[127]](#footnote-127) However, in the Supreme Court case of *Kløvtveit*, in circumstances similar to that of *Otra II*, such an argument succeeded.[[128]](#footnote-128) Here too, alternative development was not deemed foreseeable, but unlike in *Otra II*, the lay appraisers in the court of appeal decided to compensate the owners based on the premise that it was foreseeable that they would have cooperated with the expropriating party.

That is, the appraisal court of appeal held that in the absence of the power to expropriate, the waterfalls would have been exploited in exactly the same way, except through cooperation, not expropriation.[[129]](#footnote-129) Crucially, this also meant that the court was free to replace the natural horsepower method by what they thought the parties would actually have done to set up a cooperation project. Here the appraisal court found that a leasehold model would have been likely, since this is the model generally used on the waterfall market.

I think the approach of *Kløvtveit* is far superior to that of *Otra II*. For commercial projects, it seems that in the absence of a power to expropriate, any rational buyer would look to cooperate with the owners.[[130]](#footnote-130) Hence, the foreseeability test itself may be applied, an approach that will naturally lead to the rejection of the natural horsepower method in favour of more realistic forms of benefit sharing.

*Kløvtveit* was discussed briefly in *Otra II*. But the presiding judge chose to focus on what he regarded as the `practical problems' associated with a possible cooperation project.[[131]](#footnote-131) As the cooperation model was not the center of attention in the case, one can still hope that *Kløvtveit*, not *Otra II*, will become the influential precedent for future cases.

At the same time, the final outcome of *Kløvtveit* serves as a warning that the solution offered there is very frail. In particular, while losing the primary argument, the expropriating party successfully argued that the following question had to be put to the appraisal court: if the owners had decided to cooperate with the expropriating party, when exactly would this joint endeavour have applied for a development licence?

It was held that the no-scheme rule applied here, so that the actual time-line of the expropriation project fell to be disregarded. But would a joint application for development have been successful, at a later point in time? As it turned out, the answer to this question, based on a concrete assessment, was that a licence would probably not have been granted. Hence, the cooperation project fell to be disregarded as unforeseeable after all. The case therefore conclude just as the *Otra II*, with compensation awarded according to the natural horsepower method.

Indeed, every single case where the Supreme Court has commented that the traditional method may be abandoned when alternative developments are foreseeable, have eventually been decided based on the premise that alternatives are *not* foreseeable. In my opinion, this serves to illustrate a broader point. In particular, it suggests that there may be inherent difficulties in setting up a system that attempts to ensure benefit sharing through complicated counterfactual assessments of what *would have happened* if an expropriation scheme had not existed.

The pitfalls are many and the room for creative arguments by resourceful parties is great. So great, in fact, that the goal of achieving meaningful benefit sharing might soon come to appear rather remote in many, if not most, concrete cases. However, the case study presented here also seems to show that `simple’ alternatives, such as awarding a fixed premium, or relying on theoretical assessment formulas, are also unlikely to provide enhanced legitimacy in the long run. If the basic compensation is only a tiny fraction of the real commercial value, a 25 % premium will not make much of a difference.

In the end, the idea that benefit sharing can be imposed *post hoc* by courts might be inherently flawed. At least, I think the Norwegian experience warrants some pessimism in this regard, suggesting that there are limits to how far one can get when attempting to address legitimacy through compensation reform.

**6. Conclusion and Future Work**

In this article, I have explored the possibility of enhancing the legitimacy of economic development takings by establishing compensation practices that ensure better benefit sharing with owners. I started with a brief presentation of the US debate, where this suggestion has received theoretical attention. I noted that from a practical point of view, one of the major obstacles to benefit sharing through compensation appears to be the no-scheme principle, whereby changes in value due to the expropriation scheme are not supposed to influence compensation awards.

Following up on this, I took a closer look at the no-scheme principle, based on recent case law from the UK. I argued that the principle, as it is understood there, does not necessarily stand in the way of benefit sharing, at least not as long as the commercial potential of the land that is taken can be said to pre-exist the development scheme that unlocks it. I argued that despite appearances, this question is not primarily a question of fact, but a much deeper question of what meaning property is taken to have within society and within the regulatory framework set up to regulate (commercial) land uses.

I argued that while this is a politically sensitive question that should normally be left to political decision-makers, some situations might call for a more principled approach in light of constitutional and human rights perspectives. I argued that such a situation arises when the regulatory system pushes for commercial exploitation of a development potential, but acts in such a way that the potential is taken from the land owners and handed over to some external commercial entity. Here the lack of legitimate reasons for denying benefit sharing is acute, suggesting a critical look at established compensation practices.

Following up on this, I went on to consider Norwegian expropriation law. I first gave a general overview, focusing on the no-scheme principle, before I turned to the case of waterfall expropriation, for which the principle has never been understood as a hindrance to benefit sharing. However, the traditional approach to waterfall expropriations has gradually become more and more unsatisfactory, causing controversy and a recent revision of established compensation practices. I analysed these developments and concluded that although it is now recognized, in principle, that the loss of a hydropower potential should be compensated, this is hard to implement in practice. This, I argued, points towards the inherent inadequacy of a system that attempts to ensure benefit sharing through compensation rather than actual participation.

I think my conclusion points towards interesting avenues for future work. First, I note that my analysis can serve as an argument in favour of looking at alternatives to expropriation in cases involving economic development. This is a perspective that has already emerged in the US debate, particularly through the work of Heller and Hills, who have proposed a novel institution for collective action, the *land assembly district,* that they think can obviate the need for expropriation in many cases when economic development appears to be desirable.[[132]](#footnote-132)

I think this kind of work points to the future in the debate on economic development takings. Second, I would like to briefly mention that Norway has an entire legal framework in place that can shed further light also on this proposal. I am referring here to the system of so-called  *land consolidation courts*, special tribunals that are empowered to organize development projects involving fragmented property rights.[[133]](#footnote-133) Importantly, this legal framework leaves room for *compelling* owners to cooperate and participate, in some cases also with external commercial actors. At the same time, it is a fundamental principle of land consolidation that measures can only be ordered if they create enough benefits to offset any losses for all the owners and properties involved.[[134]](#footnote-134)

In relation to hydropower development, the framework is already being put to use in an increasing number of cases.[[135]](#footnote-135) Moreover, there are forces in the Norwegian government that are pushing for land consolidation as an alternative to expropriation more generally.[[136]](#footnote-136) In my opinion, this points towards the future, as it promises to provide a highly flexible approach for dealing with property and economic development using varying degrees of compulsion. Moreover, it provides an interesting case study against which to judge other proposals, such as that put forth by Heller and Hills. A further study of this, however, must be left for another article.

1. A no-scheme rule is a rule that is meant to ensure that compensation is calculated without taking into account changes in the property’s value that are due to the expropriation or the scheme underlying it. This terminology is established in the UK, see, e.g., *Compulsory Purchase and Compensation: Disregarding the Scheme* (Discussion Paper, Law Commission 2001). In the UK, the basic no-scheme rule was developed by the courts, and the common law expression of it is also known as the *Pointe Gourde* principle, so named after *Pointe Gourde Quarring & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago)* [1947] UKPC 71. Statutory no-scheme rules are found in the Land Compensation Act 1961, sections 5(3), 6, and 9 (see also sections 14 to 17 regarding the planning permissions that may be taken into account when calculating compensation). In comparative literature, no-scheme rules are also sometimes referred to as *elimination* rules, see J. Sluysmans, S. Verbist & Regien de Graaff, `Compensation for Expropriation: How Compensation Reflects a Vision on Property’ 2014 *European Property Law Journal*, pp. 5, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See generally T.W. Merrill, `The Economics of Public Use’, *Cornell Law Review,* Vol. 72, 1986; L.A. Fennell, `Taking Eminent Domain Apart’, 2004 *Michigan State Law Review*; J.E. Krier & C. Serkin, `Public Ruses’, 2004 *Michigan State Law Review*; A. Lehavi & A.N. Licht, `Eminent Domain, Inc.’, *Columbia Law Review*, Vol. 107, 2007; A. Bell & G. Parchomovsky, `Taking Compensation Private’, *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 59, 2007; B.A. Householder, `Kelo Compensation: The Future of Economic Development Takings’, *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, Vol. 82, 2007. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. I believe my comparative approach is justified, as the core idea of the no-scheme principle seems to be largely the same across different jurisdictions. In fact, I am not aware of a single jurisdiction that does not include some rule corresponding to (aspect of) the no-scheme principle. In addition to the jurisdictions discussed in this article, I mention that no-scheme rules are also found in civil law jurisdictions like Germany and the Netherlands, see J. Sluysmans, S. Verbist & Regien de Graaff, `Compensation for Expropriation: How Compensation Reflects a Vision on Property’ 2014 *European Property Law Journal*, pp. 5, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For a small sample of US scholarship on this, see G.S. Alexander, `Eminent Domain and Secondary Rent-Seeking’, *New York University Journal of Law & Liberty,* Vol. 1, 2005; L.S. Underkuffer, `Kelo’s moral failure’, *William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal*, Vol. 15, 2006; I. Somin, `Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo’, *Supreme Court Economic Review*, Vol. 15, 2007; I. Somin, `The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo’ *Minnesota Law Review*, Vol. 93, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The importance of proportionality in relation to property as a human right has been emphasized by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). See, e.g., *Lindheim and others v Norway*, [2012] ECHR 985, paras. 119-125 with further references. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See, e.g.,Fennell, *supra,* pp. 965-966. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See, e.g., R.H. Freilich, `Condemnation Blight: Analysis and Suggested Solutions’ *in* A.T. Ackerman & D.W. Dynkowski (Eds.), *Current Condemnation Law: Takings, Compensation and Benefits,* 2nd edn, American Bar Association, Chicago, 2006, p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See Fennell, *supra,* p. 962. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Id.*, p. 963. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Id.*, p. 966-967. For a general personhood building theory of property law, see M.J. Radin, *Reinterpreting Property,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993. For a general economic theory of the subjective value of independence, see M. Bens & B.S. Frey, `Being Independent Is a Great Thing: Subjective Evaluations of Self-Employment and Hierarchy’, *Economica*, Vol. 75, 2008. For an even broader, non- individualistic and non-utilitarian, theory of property, based on notions such as human flourishing and social obligation, see the work of G.S. Alexander et.al., `A Statement of Progressive Property’, *Cornell Law Review*, Vol. 94, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See, generally, Lehavi & Licht, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Id*., p. 1741. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Id*., p. 1735. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. *Id*., p. 1741. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Merrill, *supra,* p.90-93. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Krier & Serkin, s*upra,* pp. 865-873. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Fennell, *supra,* pp. 995-996. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Bell & Parchomovsky, *supra,* pp. 890-900. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Lehavi & Licht*, supra,* pp. 1732-1733. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Id.*, p. 1734. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. *Id.*, pp. 1735-1736. It is important to note, however, that in some cases, the public purpose of a taking can be to deprive the owner of economic privileges that are considered undesirable from a societal perspective (I will not enter the discussion about the extent to which this is legitimate). This can also lead to private-to-private transfers, such as in the US case of *Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff* 467 US 229 (1984). But cases like this are *not* economic development takings in the sense I am using that term in this article. I note, however, that the distinction between economic development takings and other kinds of takings, is far from clear, and appears to be relatively unexplored in legal scholarship so far. In fact, I believe that making this distinction clearer is an interesting avenue for future research. For instance, such an investigation would promise to shed new and interesting light on Justice O’Connor’s nuanced position on legitimacy (O’Connor delivered both the leading opinion in favour of private-to-private transfer in *Midkiff,* as well as the leading dissent, objecting against it, in *Kelo v City of New London* 545 US 469 (2005)). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. For an example, I refer to the infamous case of *Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit* 410 Mich. 616 (1981). In *Poletown*, around 1300 homes were condemned at the request of General Motors, who wished to set up a new car assembly plant where the homes had been. Although this was a taking for profit it seems hard to imagine that any other developer would be interested in bargaining for the right to purchase the entire site in question, taking into account its scale and how it had been laid out especially so that it would suit plans formulated by General Motors. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, ‘The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain’, 57 *Oregon Law Review* 203 (1978), pp. 206-207. See also Errol E Meidinger, ‘The ‘’public uses’’ of eminent domain: History and policy’, Environmental law 11 (1980), especially at pp. 23-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Ibid.* [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See, e.g., *Alabama Interstate Power Co. v. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co.* 186 Ala. 622, 65 So. 287 (1913), at p. 288. This particular case later went to the Supreme Court, where Justice Holmes made his famous comment that ‘the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is established’’, see *Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co.* 240 US 30 (1916), at p. 32. I remark that the scope of the statutory rules under scrutiny in this case, which justifies viewing this as a Mill Act case rather than a case revolving around a public utility, is made clearer in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama cited above, see particularly the dissenting opinion of Justice de Graffenried at pp. 296-297. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See, e.g., *Stowell v Flagg* 11 Mass. 364 (1814). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See, e.g., *Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.* 113 US 9 (1885). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See, e.g., Meidinger, *supra,* pp. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Ibid,* see also Berger, *supra,* at p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See, e.g., *Murdock v. Stickney* 62 Mass. 113, p. 116 (‘’ The principle on which this law is founded is not, as has sometimes been supposed, the right of eminent domain, the sovereign right of taking private property for public use.’’) See also *Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co.* 12 Pick. 68 (1831), pp. 72-73 (explaining that the Massachusetts Mill Act was meant as a solution to the problems that arise when no riparian owner can exercise his ‘’full rights’’ without interfering with the rights of other owners). See also Meidinger, *supra,* at p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. I also mention a close parallel to the proposal of Heller and Hills, who argue for what they call *Land Assembly Districts,* institutions that can function as an alternative to eminent domain by providing a framework for collective action (and compulsion) to solve the holdout problem and ensure rational economic development in situations when property is fragmented. See M. Heller & R. Hills, `Land Assembly Districts’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 121, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. For instance, Meidinger, *supra,* at p. 24, presents the approach taken by courts in Massachusetts in a rather pessimistic light, as an `artful’ argument used to justify highly preferential treatment of the manufacturing industry in that state. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *Fraser v City of Fraserville* [1917] AC 187, p. 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. For a history of the rule in UK law, clearly illustrating the difficulty in interpreting it and applying it to concrete cases, I point to Appendix D of *Towards a Compulsory Purchase Code: (1) Compensation* (Report no. 286, Law Commission 2003). See also *Compulsory Purchase and Compensation: Disregarding the Scheme, supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *Waters and other v Welsh National Assembly* [2004] UKHL 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *Id.*, p. 19. See also the discussion on the relationship between statutory and common law no-scheme rules in *Transport for London v Spirerose Limited* [2009] 1 WLR 1797. This case raised the issue of how to approach the situation that arises if, in the absence of the expropriation scheme, the owner would have been in a good position to obtain planning permission for alternative development. The question was whether this prospect should be reflected in the valuation in a manner proportionate to the probability of obtaining a license, resulting in a so-called ``hope value’’, or as a certainty, under the balance of probabilities rule of proof (resulting in higher compensation). It was clear that it was likely, but not certain, that planning permission would in facthave been granted in the absence of the expropriation scheme. But the House of Lords rejected the approach of the lower courts, which had been to treat planning permission as a certainty. In doing so, the Lords also argued against a broad application of the *Pointe Gourde* principle (which could have, but need not have, encouraged more counter-factual thinking and a balance of probabilities approach). Instead, they preferred to focus on the statutory no-scheme rules found in the Land Compensation Act 1961, which made hope value seem more natural (antithetically, in the absence of statutory rules to suggest counter-factual assessment on this point). The apparent support for statutory no-scheme rules, despite their complexities, complements (and contrasts) with the reasoning in *Waters,* but it remains to be seen whether *Transport for London* will become an important precedent outside the specific context of hope value calculations. For an argument that it should put the common law no-scheme principle ‘’largely to an end’’, see Raj Gupta, `Ruling rewrites case law on compensation terms’, *Planning,* Dec 4, 2009, Issue 1847, p.9. For more or less the opposite view (much better aruged, in my opinion), see Robert Carnwath, `After Spirerose – back to the common law?’, Journal of Planning & Environment Law, Vol.2011(5), p.527-537. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v Revenue Divisional officer, Vizagapatam* [1939] AC 302; *Pointe Gourde Quarring & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago)*, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. See, *id., Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v Revenue Divisional officer, Vizagapatam,* p. 319. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. *Id.*, p. 316-317. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Pointe Gourde Quarring & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago), supra.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Pointe Gourde Quarring & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago), supra,* p. 572. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Andrew Baum et.al., *Statutory Valuations,* 4th edn, Routledge, Oxon, 2014, pp. 242-244. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. *Waters and other v Welsh National Assembly, supra,* p. 164. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. See *Towards a Compulsory Purchase Code: (1) Compensation*, *supra*, pp. 69-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. In some jurisdictions, one will sometimes regard this as a taking in its own right, known as a regulatory taking in the US. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. *Pointe Gourde Quarring & Transport Company Limited v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands (Trinidad and Tobago), supra,* p. 572. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. *Waters and others v Welsh National Assembly*, *supra,* p. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See Andrew Baum et.al., *supra,* pp. 242-244 and S. Crow, `Compulsory purchase for economic development: An international perspective’, 2007 *Journal of Planning & Environmental Law*. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd & Anor v Bocardo SA* (2010) 5 WLR 654 (UKSC). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *Batchelor v Kent County Council* (1989) 59 P & CR 357, 361. Cited by Lord Nicholls in *Waters and other v Welsh National Assembly*, *supra*, p. 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. *Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd & Anor v Bocardo SA, supra,*  p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *Id.*, p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd & Anor v Bocardo SA, supra,* p. 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. *Id.*, p. 163. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. See, generally, Somin 2009, *supra,* and T. Sandefur, ‘The Backlash So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?’ 2006 (3) *Michigan State Law Review.* [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway 1814, s 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ot.prp.nr.56 (1970-1971), pp. 19-20 (proposition from the Ministry to the parliament regarding the Expropriation Compensation Act 1973). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. See Appraisal Act 1917, s 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Act no 1 of 1 June 1917 relating to Appraisal Disputes and Expropriation Cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Appraisal Act 1917, s 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. See *Id.*, s 22, with further references to the Civil Dispute Act 2005 (Act

    No 90 of 17 June 2005 relating to the Mediation and Procedure in Civil Disputes). [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. See Appraisal Act 1917, s 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. See Appraisal Act 1917, s 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. F. Castberg, *Norges Statsforfatning, Bind 2,* 3rd edn, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1964, p.

    268. The translation is mine, as are all other translated quotes from Norwegian sources that appear in this article. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. *Id.*, p. 268. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. *Hovedstyret for Norges Vassdrags- og Elektrisitetsvesen v A/S Tuddal,* Rt-1956-109 (*Tuddal)*. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. *Id.*, p. 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. *A/S Den Ankerske Marmorforretning v Norges Statsbaner,* Rt-1956-493 (*Marmor)*. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. *Id.*, pp. 498-499. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. *Id.*, p. 499. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. See generally Ø. Thomassen, *Herlege Tider: Norsk Fysisk Planlegging 1930–1965* (PhD Thesis), NTNU, Trondheim, 1997; T. Kleven, *Fra Gjenreisning til Samfunnsplanlegging: Norsk Kommuneplanlegging 1965–2005*, Tapir Akademiske Forlag, Trondheim, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. See generally D.O. Skjold, *Statens Kraft 1947–1965: For Velferd og Industri,* Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2006; L. Thue & Y. Nilsen, *Statens Kraft 1965-2006: Miljø og Marked,*  Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Ot.prp.nr.56 (1970-1971), *supra,* pp. 19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Appointed by the King in Council on 6 August 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. See, e.g., the Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. *Report Regarding Appraisal Procedures and Compensation following Expropriation* (NUT 1969:2), pp. 136-137. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. *Id.*, p. 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. *Id.*, p. 142. Since this assumption was made quite generally, it also corresponds to a broader view on the no-scheme principle than that endorsed by Castberg, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. *Id.*, p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. *Report Regarding Appraisal Procedures and Compensation following Expropriation, supra,* p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Ot.prp.nr.56 (1970-1971) , *supra,* pp. 19-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. *Id.*, pp. 17-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. *Id.*, p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Ot.prp. nr.56 (1970-1971), *supra,* p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. *Johnsrud and others v Ullensaker commune*, Rt-1976-1 (*Kløfta*). [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. The clearest indication of this shift is found in recent case law wherein the Supreme Court has provided a myriad of detailed rules and directions regarding how appraisal courts should decide whether to consider public plans binding for the compensation award or to disregard them under a no-scheme rule. See generally *Arealplaner og Ekspropriasjonserstatning* (NOU 2003:29), pp. 7-9 (governmental report from a committe appointed by the King in Council). [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Expropriation Compensation Act 1984, s 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. *Id.*, s 5-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. *Arealplaner og Ekspropriasjonserstatning*, *supra,* 7-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. See B. Stordrange, `Reguleringsplaner og Ekspropriasjonserstatning’, 2007 *Lov og Rett,* pp. 107-108. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. In practice, this means that the appraisal court is free to compensate the owner on the basis that some other use would have been foreseeable in the absence of the expropriation, e.g., housing uses. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. One might ask if it has status of constitutional customary law, especially since it concerns the mechanism by which a constitutional rule is meant to be upheld. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. See generally C. Sontum & E. Sofienlund, `Ekspropriasjon av Vannkraft

    – Hvorfor den Historiske Metoden fra Norsk Rettspraksis ikke er Relevant i Dagens Marked’, 2007(4) *Sm˚akraftnytt*. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. The narrative in Norway was very similar to that found in case law from the state of Massachusetts at this time, c.f., my discussion in Section 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. See Olaf Amundsen, *Lov om vasdragsreguleringer av 14 december 1917 (nr. 17) med senere tillæg og forandringer: med kommentar,* Ascheough (1928), p. 29. For the limited expropriation authorities that did exist (and which were strikingly similar to those found in many US Mill Acts), see W.S. Dahl, *Den Norske Vasdragsret*, Den Norske Forlagsforening (1888), pp. 58, 60, 69-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. See generally the description given in the Supreme Court case of *Agder Energi Produksjon AS v Magne Møllen,* Rt-2008-82 (*Uleberg)*, paras. 81-84. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. See Watercourse Regulation Act 1917, s 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. It should be noted that these reforms did not dismantle the actual market for waterfalls overnight, but they gave state and municipality companies so many advantages over other actors, as well as owners, that the market was no longer sustained except through the compensation practices of the appraisal courts. The waterfall `market' would slide further and further into the legal sphere, away from the physical and commercial reality of hydropower development. The `market price' for waterfalls increasingly came to mean simply the prices paid in recent appraisal disputes. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. A horsepower is an old-fashioned unit of effect which is still sometimes used, e.g., in relation to cars. In the context of electricity, it has been largely replaced by *Watt.* [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. See *Uleberg, supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. See I. Vislie, `Ekspropriasjon og Skjønn i Vassdrag’ *in* T. Falkanger & K. Haagensen (Eds.), Vassdrags- og Energirett, 2nd edn, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Regulation of a watercourse can involve building a reservoir and/or installations that transfer water from one river to another. Then, if there is excess water, for instance due to flooding, water can be stored in the dam for later use. When there is no drought, the stored water can be released. In this way, it becomes possible to even out the water-flow over the year. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. See generally Sontum & Sofienlund, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. See O. Rogstad, `Verdien av R˚a Vannkraft’, 1956 (4) *Fossekallen*. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. In my opinon, this mechanism has become very clear after the occasional adoption of new, genuinely market-based, methods in recent years, see Section 5.2 below. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. In a report made in connection with the *Bjølvo* case in 2002, a list of prices paid per natural horsepower was presented. Most of the prices had been set by the appraisal courts, but some were also taken from voluntary agreements. The author of the report suggested that the price level in 2002 was kr 200-250 (£ 20-25) per natural horsepower. See the decision from 03 June 2003, in case no. 01-00091B (THARD-2001-91) at the district court of Hardanger. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. <http://www.bkk.no/om\_oss/anlegg-utbygging/Kraftverk\_og\_vassdrag/modalsvassdraget/article28961.ece?l=no> [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. See RG-2000-459 (*Hellandsfoss*). [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. *Id.* [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. See LG-2007-176723 (*Sauda)*. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. The valuation in *Hellandsfoss* was said to be based on the value in 1992, when the expropriating party had taken possession of the waterfalls. If we compare with the price level in 2002, the natural horsepower method would perhaps result in just under kr 2 million in compensation, so that `actual’ market value compensation, according to the price level identified in the *Sauda* case, woud be `only’ about 75 times higher. In some later cases, influenced by the level of compensation paid in cases when the natural horsepower method has not been used, the unit price per natural horsepower has increased further. In the past few years, the unit price has typically been kr 500-800. See, e.g., LG-2011-205374 (*Kløvtveit II,* appraisal court of appeal) and LA-2010-181441 (*Otra II*, appraisal court of appeal). Still, however, the imbalance is severe, with owners typically getting at least 10-20 times more in compensation when the natural horsepower method is not used. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Source: private correspondence. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. <http://www.bkk.no/om\_oss/anlegg-utbygging/Kraftverk og vassdrag/

     andre-vassdrag/article29899.ece>. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. I also remark that the value awarded in *Sauda* was market value, not value of use. It was assumed, in particular, that the owners would have to cooperate with a `professional’ energy company to develop hydropower. This, in effect, halved the compensation awarded, since the Court’s decision was based on the premise that the professional company was willing to pay about 50 % of the profit as rent to the owners. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. I mention that in a setting where the owners are politically powerful and can exert undue influence on the compensation process, the effect can be reversed, so that the ``market based'' approach leads to inflated compensation levels, including elements of holdout value. The general point is that the market approach can be turned to the advantage of the most resourceful and powerful groups, particularly in situations when expropriation is widely used for a particular kind of development. In such cases, a market-based approach is not as politically neutral and `objective' as its proponents tend to argue. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. As early as in 1998, in connection with the *Hellandsfoss* case (RG-2000-459), waterfall owners had asked their legal council to critically address the natural horsepower method, pointing to the fact that an actual market for waterfalls had formed. At this time, however, `professional’ lawyers in Norway were unwilling to raise this issue before the courts. For more on the history of the fight against the natural horsepower method, see Otto Dyrkolbotn, *Ingen Rettsstat,* Randi Enger, Vikanes, 2014, pp. 249-250 (including a copy of a 1998 letter from one of the waterfall owners in *Hellandsfoss* to his legal council). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. See generally Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund &Stein Erik Stinessen, `Erstatning for Erverv av Fallrettigheter’, 2006 *Tidsskrift for Eiendomsrett*; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund & Stein Erik Stinessen, `Fallerstatning – Uleberg-dommen’, 2008 *Tidsskrift for Eiendomsrett*; Ulf Larsen, Caroline Lund & Stein Erik Stinessen, `Er Naturhestekraftmetoden Rettshistorie?’, 2012(1) *Tidsskrift for Eiendomsrett*. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. See Larsen et.al. 2006 and Sontum & Sofienlund, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. *Uleberg*, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. See generally Larsen et.al., *supra* [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. See, e.g., *BKK Produksjon AS v Austgulen and others* Rt-2011-1683 (*Kløvtveit)*; *Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaen Brugseierforening v Bjørnar˚a and others* Rt-2010-1056 *(Otra I)*; *Bjørnar˚a and others v Otra Kraft DA, Otteraaens Brugseierforening* Rt-2013-612 *(Otra II)*. The argument is often sugarcoated by pointing to the reasons underlying the decision to grant a license – typically energy efficiency – rather than by focusing on the formal license itself. In this way, one arrives at an interpretation of the no-scheme rule whereby the scheme can perhaps be said to have been disregarded even though one still takes into account reasons why it should be preferred over other schemes. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. *Otra II, supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. *Otra II*, *supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Although this may in part have been due to the fact that the point was not raised before the court of appeal. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. *Kløvtveit, supra.* [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Hence, the court effectively adopted a compensation approach based on the same conceptual premise as that of Lehavi and Licht's SPDC proposal, as discussed in Section 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. This would not necessarily be a safe assumption to make for non-commercial projects. Such projects may fail to provide the necessary incentives for cooperation, even though they should nevertheless be carried out in the public interest. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. See *Otra II, supra,* paras. 68-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. M. Heller & R. Hills, `Land Assembly Districts’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 121, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Land Consolidation Act 1979. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. See generally Ø. Ravnå, Perspektiver på Jordskifte, Gyldendahl, Oslo, 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. S. Stokstad, Bruksordning ved Jordskifte i Samband med Utbygging av

     Småskalakraftverk (Master Thesis), Universitetet for miljø og biovitskap, Ås, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. A new Act on land consolidation will take effect from 2016, and in this Act any party who is authorised to expropriate property is also authorised - as an alternative or complementary measure - to initialise and act as a party to a land consolidation dispute that seeks to organize the development project. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)